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Introduction
The number of U.S. bank failures jumped sharply
in the mid-1980s and has remained disturbingly
high, averaging roughly 170 banks a year over
the 1985-1990 period. Furthermore, large-bank
failures have become increasingly common. For
a variety of reasons, the timing of closures and
the resolution techniques used have severely
strained the resources of the Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation (FDIC). These develop-
ments have stimulated a great deal of debate
about the causes of costly bank closures and
about alternative ways to prevent them. One
focus of this debate has been on the appropriate
roles of market versus regulatory discipline. A
necessary condition for effective discipline by
either force is the ability to identify high-risk
banks accurately at a reasonable length of time
prior to failure without the use of expensive and
time-consuming on-site examinations. This re-
quires the use of some sort of statistical model,
conventionally labeled an "early warning
model," to translate bank characteristics into
estimates of risk. There is considerable debate
about whether models of sufficient accuracy can
be built using only currently available account-
ing data.
1
This study examines a particular type of early
warning model called a Cox proportional haz-
ards model, which basically produces estimates
of the probability that a bank with a given set of
characteristics will survive longer than some
specified length of time into the future. The sam-
ple consists of all banks that failed between
January 1, 1987 and October 31, 1990 and a ran-
domly selected group of roughly 1,500 nonfailed
banks. Using a relatively small set of publicly
available explanatory variables, the model iden-
tifies both failed and healthy banks with a high
degree of accuracy. Furthermore, a large propor-
tion of banks that subsequently failed are
flagged as potential failures in periods prior to
their actual demise. The classification accuracy
of the model over time is impressive, since the
coefficients are based on 1986 data and are not
updated over time. In short, the results demon-
strate that reasonably accurate early warning
models can be built and maintained at relatively
low cost.
The following section describes the propor-
tional hazards model (PHM) in general terms
and compares it to alternative statistical early
1 This is the opinion reflected in Randall (1989), for example.warning models. A short discussion of sampling
issues follows. Section III contains a more
detailed discussion about the specification of
the model estimated in this paper, and section
IV presents the model's estimation results and
classification accuracy. The final section con-
tains a brief summary and conclusions.
I. The Proportional
Hazards Model
Of the large number of early warning/failure
prediction studies that have been done, most
have employed discriminant analysis or probit/
logit techniques to construct the models. These
models are designed to generate the probability
that a bank with a given set of characteristics
will fall into one of two or more classes, most
often failure/nonfailure.
2 Further, the predicted
probabilities are of failure/nonfailure at some
unspecified point in time over an interval im-
plied by the study design.
Like these statistical techniques, a PHM can
be used to generate estimates of the probability
of bank failure or, alternatively, of survival. How-
ever, a PHM has several advantages relative to
these other types of models, including the ability
to produce estimates of probable time to failure.
In fact, it can be used to generate a survival
profile for any commercial bank (the estimated
probability of survival longer than specified
times as a function of time). The other types of
models yield only the probability that a bank
will fail at some point in time over some speci-
fied period, but provide no insight on when the
failure will occur over this period. Additionally, a
PHM does not require the user to make assump-
tions about the distributional properties of the
data (for example, multivariate normality) that
may be violated. In the one somewhat dated
study of bank failures in which a PHM is esti-
mated and used, the model is also found to be
slightly more accurate than alternative models
(see Lane, Looney, and Wansley [1986, p. 525]).
The dependent variable in a PHM is time
until failure, T. The survivor function, which
represents the probability of surviving longer
than t periods, has the following general form:
(1)
where F(f) is the cumulative distribution func-
tion for the random variable, time to failure. The
probability density function of t is equal to
fit) = -S'(t). Given these definitions, the gen-
eral form of the so-called hazard function is then




The hazard function specifies the instantaneous
probability of failure given survival up to time t.
A number of different types of hazard models
can be specified, depending on the assumptions
made about the nature of the failure time distri-
bution.
3 In the PHM, the hazard function is
assumed to have the following rather simple
form:
(3) b(t\ X, B) = ho(t)g(X,B),
where X represents a collection of characteris-
tic variables assumed to affect the probability of
failure (or, alternatively, of survival) and B
stands for the model coefficients to be estimated
that describe how each characteristic variable
affects the likelihood of failure. The first part of
this expression, ho(t), is a nonparametric term
labeled the baseline hazard probability. This
probability depends only on time. To obtain the
failure probability in a particular case, the base-
line hazard probability is shifted proportionally
by the parametric function that is the second
part of the expression. In the Cox variant used
in this paper, the second function is assumed to
have an exponential form. That is, the Cox PHM
has the following form:
(4) h(t\ = ho(t)e
x'
B.
The related survivor function for the Cox
PHM, which is used to calculate the probability
that a commercial bank with a given set of char-
acteristics will survive longer than some given
amount of time into the future, is as follows:
(5) S(t\ X, B) = S0(t)i,
where q = e
 x
 B and
-J ho(u) du .
• 2 In some studies, the categorization of banks into risk classes is
made on the basis of confidential CAMEL ratings.
• 3 See, for example, the excellent review of a number of
hazard models in Kiefer (1988) or Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980).As in the hazard function, the first part of this
expression, So (t), is called the baseline sur-
vival probability and depends only on time. It is
the same for every bank. To calculate survival
probabilities for any bank, it is necessary to
choose the relevant time horizon that deter-
mines the relevant baseline probability and then
plug the values of its characteristic variables
into the formula.
The PHM does have several disadvantages,
although some of these are shared by competing
failure prediction models. Perhaps the most
important drawback is that estimation of the
PHM requires data on the time to failure. As
many others have noted, there is a distinction in
banking between insolvency (an economic
event) and failure (a regulatory event). That is,
bank failure represents a regulatory decision. So
whether one uses a PHM or a logit model, it is
actually the regulatory closure rule that is being
modeled. This can be problematic when one is
analyzing bank failures over the late 1980s. Dur-
ing this time, regulators had to resolve a number
of large distressed holding companies in Texas,
where financial problems were concentrated in
some but not all of a holding company's banks
(generally, the lead or large subsidiary banks).
Typically, closure of the insolvent units was
delayed while attempts were made to dispose of
the entire organization. Thus, in some cases, the
reported financial condition of the larger subsidi-
aries of these holding companies suggests that
they were probably insolvent prior to resolution,
while smaller, sometimes numerous coaffiliate
banks exhibited relatively healthy financials even
shortly before closure. Failure to control for these
circumstances in some way could significantly
affect the coefficients and classification accuracy
of any type of estimated early warning model,
but the nature of the adjustment is critically
important for PHMs given the nature of the
dependent variable.
Empirically, this problem can be dealt with
in a number of ways. Some researchers have
added a consolidated holding-company size
variable to estimated bank failure equations (see
Gajewski [1989D- Others have estimated two-
equation systems: a solvency equation and a
failure equation, adding holding company var-
iables to the latter (see Thomson [1989]). Alter-
natively, one could take the view that smaller
bank affiliates in unit banking states are the
functional equivalent of branches and so should
be consolidated into one or more of the larger
subsidiary banks in failure prediction studies.
4
Another, somewhat cruder, solution that is
generally equivalent to consolidation is simply
to exclude some or all of the smaller bank sub-
sidiaries of the holding companies in question.
This is the approach taken here. I include in the
estimation sample only the larger subsidiaries
(more than $500 million in total assets) of the
large Texas holding companies that failed.
5
One is still left with the problem of somewhat
ambiguous dates of failure for some of the large
Texas holding companies. For example, in sev-
eral cases, resolution transactions that were
announced (indicating that the company was
judged to be failing as of a specific date) ulti-
mately collapsed, and the institutions were not
closed until some later date. Here, following
standard practice, I use the failure date desig-
nated by the FDIC (typically the date that FDIC
funds are disbursed).
Another possible disadvantage of the simple
PHM is the assumption that the values of the
explanatory variables remain constant over the
time horizon implicit in the specification. Obvi-
ously, this may not be the case, and if this
assumption is violated, classification accuracy of
estimated PHMs could suffer. It is possible to
estimate PHMs that relax this assumption (with
so-called time-varying covariates).
6 However,
this complicates the analysis and is not under-
taken here.
II. Sampling
Using the entire population of banks to gen-
erate early warning models is typically not done,
since this method is costly and requires substan-
tial computer time and suitable hardware and
software. Practically, models of comparable ac-
curacy can be built and maintained much more
easily and cheaply using a sample of banks.
This is the approach taken here.
In bank failure studies, sampling is an impor-
tant issue, since it can significantly affect the
reported results. One common approach — the
one used in the only PHM study done to date —
is the use of a matched sample. In this type of
approach, the sample initially consists of some
collection of failed banks. Then, for each failed
• 4 In fact, limited consolidation was authorized under a change in
Texas branching laws in 1987, and was done in varying degrees by
several of the state's multibank holding companies.
• 5 However, I include all bank affiliates of failed holding companies
in the holdout sample.
• 6 For a discussion of time-varying covariates, see Kalbfleisch and
Prentice (1980).bank included in the sample, the researcher
adds one or more nonfailed banks determined
to be peers. This method is tedious and costly
and requires numerous subjective judgments on
the part of the researcher. It also is infeasible to
use when analyzing relatively recent failures,
since close matching is simply not possible. Fur-
thermore, it is not clear that models developed
using matched samples could be easily updated/
reestimated, and updating may be necessary to
preserve model accuracy.
I rejected relying solely on random sampling
because of the danger of too few failed banks
and because of cost considerations. Instead, I
employed a choice-based sampling approach
similar to that used in numerous other failure
prediction studies. Specifically, the data set
includes all banks that failed between January 1,
1987 and October 31,1990 for which complete
data could be obtained and that were in oper-
ation for at least three full years prior to failure.
The nonfailed portion of the sample consists of
roughly 1,500 randomly selected banks. The esti-
mation sample is comprised of the 1987 and 1988
failures and approximately 1,000 of the non-
failed banks. The remainder of the failed and
nonfailed banks comprise the holdout sample.
III. The Specific




Lane, Looney, and Wansley (1986), hereafter
referred to as LLW, estimate two different ver-
sions of PHMs using a relatively small sample of
banks that failed over the 1979-1983 period and
a matched sample of nonfailed banks. One ver-
sion, labeled a one-year model, is designed to
generate a survivor function that permits the
user to predict the probability that a bank with a
given set of characteristics will survive longer
than times ranging from roughly zero to 12
months into the future. Another version, the two-
year model, allows the user to predict survival
probabilities ranging from roughly 12 to 24
months into the future. In their sample, LLW
pool failures from all the years examined and
use stepwise methods to select a relatively small
subset of 21 financial condition variables for use
as explanatory variables. They do not employ
any local economic condition variables.
In the one-year model, LLW find the follow-
ing ratios to be significant and include them in
the final form of the estimated equation: the log
of the commercial loans to total loans ratio, the
total loans to total deposits ratio, the log of the
total capital to total assets ratio, and the log of
the operating expense to operating income ratio.
In the two-year model, the ratios included are
the total loans to total assets ratio, the log of the
commercial loans to total loans ratio, the log of
the total capital to total assets ratio, the log of the
operating expense to operating income ratio, the
log of the municipal securities to total assets
ratio, and the rate of return on equity.
7 It is
interesting that none of the loan quality variables
that LLW examine is found to be significant in
either model. However, their set of loan quality
variables does not include a measure of nonper-
forming loans, since such data were not reported
by banks over the period examined. This may
have lowered the classification accuracy of
LLW's models, because nonperforming loan data
are probably a better leading indicator of incip-
ient asset quality problems than variables such
as loan loss provisions or net chargeoffs, and
asset quality problems are a primary cause of
bank failure. The out-of-sample classification ac-
curacy of these relatively simple models is good,
although the holdout sample is relatively small
and the time period examined is quite short.
The Current Model
I designed the model used here to produce es-
timates of the probability that a bank with some
given set of characteristics will survive longer
than times ranging from roughly zero to 24
months into the future. To accomplish this, I
measure the dependent variable, the time to
failure, as the time in months from the end of
1986 to the failure date for each failed bank in
the estimation sample. For all nonfailed banks
in the estimation sample, I censor the time to
failure at 24 months, since these banks are
known to have survived at least this amount of
time into the future.
8 I measure all of the
explanatory variables for both failed and non-
failed banks as of year-end 1986. This approach
• 7 LLW use log values in some cases to transform explanatory vari-
ables that appear to be non-normally distributed. This is done because
the authors estimate competing discriminant models that require the ex-
planatory variables to be multivariate normal.
• 8 An additional advantage of the PHM is that it can accommodate
censored failure times.•
is feasible given the relatively large number of
failed banks over the 1987-1988 period and the
sampling method used. So, unlike LLW, I do not
pool failures from different years. Furthermore,
by estimating a single model with a 24-month
time horizon, I incorporate the implicit assump-
tion that these survival probabilities depend
only on a single set of explanatory variables.
The Explanatory
Variables
In general, I employ subsets of a relatively small
number of "typical" financial ratios used in
previous bank failure prediction studies as
explanatory variables in this study. All of these
are publicly available numbers drawn from the
year-end reports of the Federal Financial Institu-
tions Examination Council's Reports on Condi-
tion and Income, known as call reports. The
variable names and definitions, along with the
1986 mean values for banks in the estimation
sample, appear in the appendix. I do not use
loan classification data drawn from examination
reports for a variety of reasons, the most impor-
tant of which is that such data are available only
at irregular intervals.
9
The only other type of explanatory variable
used in this study is a single indicator of "local"
economic conditions. Recently, a consensus has
emerged that such variables have a significant
impact on the probability of bank failure and
should somehow be incorporated into the analy-
sis. However, an examination of previous
research reveals that this has not typically been
done in the past. In those studies that use local
economic variables, the standard approach is to
add one or more as explanatory variables in the
estimated failure equation. The identity of the
variables and the precise forms of these relation-
ships differ considerably. Some researchers have
found that such variables are significant and aid
classification accuracy.
More recent studies have used state-level eco-
nomic variables such as the change in personal
income, unemployment, or real estate construc-
tion. Some employ a form of state economic
diversification variable, while others simply add
variables designed to capture the importance of
the energy or farm sector in a given state. In a
few studies, economic data from the county level
or the metropolitan statistical area are employed.
It seems inappropriate to simply add farm- or
energy-sector variables to failure prediction
equations. Although it is true that downturns in
these industries appear to be highly correlated
with bank failures in the recent past, there is no
reason to believe that this pattern will repeat
itself in the future (in the Northeast or the South-
east in the early 1990s, for example). If one
deems it desirable to add local economic vari-
ables to a bank failure model (and this may not
be the best way to proceed), a preferable
approach would be to use local variables such
as unemployment, employment, or some con-
struction series that reflect local economic shocks
regardless of their source.
I employ a state-level variable rather than a
more local variable for several reasons. Incor-
porating more local variables into the analysis is
much more tedious and costly. It would also be
more difficult to update such variables over
time. Furthermore, it is not clear that using more
local variables would produce more accurate
failure probabilities than state-level data. Pre-
vious research indicates that two of the most
useful leading indicators of economic condi-
tions at the state level are movements in build-
ing permits and initial unemployment claims.
1
0
Here, only one state variable is used: the per-
centage change in state residential housing per-
mits issued over the three-year period ending in
the year in which the other explanatory vari-
ables are measured.
Realistically, the response of the financial
condition of any individual bank to local
economic conditions varies across banks and
changes over time as managers react to antici-
pated movements in relevant local and national
economic variables. This view suggests that per-
haps a more correct approach (and a much
more ambitious one) would be to use only fore-
casted bank financial condition variables in the
failure prediction equation. The values of these
variables would be based on forecasts of local
or regional economic conditions generated
using separate models (see Goudie [1987], for
example). Alternatively, one might develop
state-level leading economic index series and
sequential probability models, which can be
used to generate the probability of a local reces-
sion, and then use these probabilities in a fail-
ure prediction model (see Phillips [1990]).
Neither of these approaches is attempted here.
• 9 It would be interesting to add the currently confidential data on 30-
to 89-day nonperforming loans to the model to see if this resulted in a sub-
stantial increase in explanatory power. Such data are likely to be highly cor-
related with classified loans and are available at regular intervals.
• 10 See Whalen (1990). The leading-indicator variables could also
reflect the divergence between actual and anticipated local economic con-
ditions, which should be an important determinant of bank asset quality


































I derive the survivor function from the underly-
ing hazard function that is actually estimated.
1
1
Although the focus in this study is on the former,
it should be noted that the coefficients from the
hazard function appear in the survivor function
unchanged. As a result, in a survivor function,
coefficients can be expected to exhibit counter-
intuitive signs. Variables that are expected to be
positively associated with the probability of sur-
vival, like return on assets (ROA), will exhibit
negative coefficients. Similarly, variables that are
expected to be negatively associated with the
probability of survival, such as the overhead
expense ratio (OHR), will have positive coeffi-
cients.
The survivor function consists of estimated
baseline survival probabilities (So [t] for various
t 's) and a vector of estimated model coefficients
(the B vector), which I use to generate survival
probabilities for banks, given their particular set
of characteristics. I estimate a number of alterna-
tive models with differing sets of explanatory
variables. The estimation results for one of these
model specifications appear in table 1.1 focus
only on a single model because this allows the
classification results to be examined in detail.
• 11 I used the Survival Module of SYSTAT to estimate the model, a
routine that employs the partial likelihood approach to estimate the B
coefficients. This approach does not require that the form of the baseline
hazard be specified. For tied failure times, I use Breslow's generalization
of the Cox likelihood function. For details, see Steinberg and Colla
(1988), appendix C.
However, I obtain similar classification results
using the other specifications.
All of the estimated coefficients exhibit the
correct sign and are highly significant. However,
it should be noted that, as in multiple regression,
collinearity among explanatory variables can be
and is a problem. Therefore, this specification,
like the others examined, is necessarily parsi-
monious. The variables that consistently exhibit
the strongest statistical relationships to the prob-
ability of bank survival are OHR, the large cer-
tificate of deposit dependence ratio, the loan to
asset ratio, the primary capital ratio, the nonper-
forming loan ratio, the net primary capital ratio,
and the change in housing permits variable. It is
interesting to note that the commercial real
estate loan variable is never found to be signifi-
cant in any version of the equation estimated,
possibly reflecting the somewhat aggregated
form of the variable used. A construction loan
variable was not employed, and this type of ac-
tivity is generally viewed as the riskiest form of
commercial real estate lending.
As noted above, the models estimated here
can be used to generate the probability that a
bank will survive longer than t units, where t
can take on any value from roughly zero to 24
months. This is done by substituting the relevant
X, B, and baseline survival probabilities into
equation (5). Allowing t to vary over the entire
permissible range for a bank with some given
set of characteristics results in the survival
profile for that bank. Thus, this profile shows
the probability that some particular bank will
survive longer than each possible t value, and
vividly portrays the model's estimate of the
health of a particular institution. Three illustra-
tive profiles are presented in figure 1.
The top curve depicts the survival profile for
a typical "healthy" bank. This profile is derived
by inserting the 1986 mean values of the explan-
atory variables for the nonfailed banks in the
estimation sample into the estimated survivor
function. Thus, the curve shows that the esti-
mated probability of a healthy bank surviving
longer than any number of months ranging from
roughly zero to 24 is high — above 0.9. The
intermediate profile is for a hypothetical
"unhealthy" bank. In this case, the explanatory
variable values are set at the 1986 mean value
for the banks in the estimation sample that failed
in 1988 (that is, those that survived roughly 12 to
24 months into the future). The vertical distance
between the two curves represents the esti-
mated reduction in survival probability for the
unhealthy bank relative to the healthy bank at
every time horizon. The estimated probabilityFIGURE 1
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a. Of the 139 banks, 107 subsequently failed within 12 to 24 months. Thus,
only 32 type II errors occurred for nonfailed banks (3.2 percent).
b. Of the 115 banks, 60 subsequently failed after 18 months. Thus, only 55
type II errors occurred for nonfailed banks (5.5 percent).
NOTE: In the estimation sample, 164 banks failed within 12 months, 252 failed
within 18 months, and 333 failed within 24 months. The number of nonfailed
banks used in the estimation sample is 1,008. Thus, the type II error rates at the
12-month, 18-month, and 24-month horizons are based on 1,177 banks, 1,089
banks, and 1,008 banks, respectively. The percentage of banks misclassified is
in parentheses.
SOURCE: Author's calculations.
of the unhealthy bank surviving longer than 24
months is roughly 0.46. The bottom curve is the
survival profile for a hypothetical "critically ill"
bank: The values of all the explanatory variables
are set at the 1986 mean values for those banks
in the estimation sample that failed within 12
months (that is, 1987 failures). Because the val-
ues of the explanatory variables for this group
of banks are indicative of very high risk and
greater likelihood of failure, the survival profile
lies well below that of both of the other groups.
The estimated 24-month survival probability for
the critically ill bank is just 0.11.
Tables 2 through 8 present the classification
results produced using the estimated model. The
analysis of classification accuracy and the types
of classification errors made using an estimated
model are the acid tests of the worth of a poten-
tial early warning model.
In the analysis presented here, I focus only
on predicted 12-, 18-, and 24-month survival
probabilities. In order to use the estimated
models to classify banks as failures or nonfail-
ures at each of these time horizons in and out of
sample, the generated survival probabilities
must be compared to some critical probability
cutoff value. Typically, the proportions of failed
and nonfailed banks in the estimation sample
are used to determine the cutoff values. This is
the approach taken here. In the estimation sam-
ple used in this study, the probabilities of a bank
surviving beyond 12, 18, and 24 months are
roughly 0.88, 0.81, and 0.75, respectively. These
are the cutoff values used in the analysis. Thus,
if a bank's estimated 24-month survival proba-
bility is less than 0.75, it is predicted to fail
within two years. If its estimated survival prob-
ability is greater than 0.75, it is predicted to sur-
vive longer than 24 months.
Type I and type II errors are defined in the
typical fashion: The former is a bank that failed
over some specified time horizon during which
it was predicted to survive, and the latter is a
bank that survived beyond some specified time
horizon during which it was predicted to fail.
Both types of errors are important in evaluating
the potential usefulness of an early warning
model. Obviously, a good model should exhibit
low type I error rates. Missing failures typically
implies delayed resolution, higher resolution
costs, or both. However, if an early warning
model is to be useful in allocating scarce exam-
ination resources, type II error rates should also
be relatively low. One exception to this general
rule is illustrated below. In particular, the catego-
rization of a prediction as a type II error depends
on the time period and the time horizon exam-
ined. Some type II errors could actually represent
banks that ultimately fail in some future period.
In evaluating the accuracy of any early warning
model, it is useful to identify how many banks
fall into this category of type II error, since they
actually represent a success.
The estimated models are quite accurate in-
sample (see table 2). The type I and type II
error rates are typically in the 10 to 15 percent
range, and the overall classification accuracy isTABLE 3
Out-of-Sample Classification











NOTE: Total number of failed banks in the sample is 169. Percentage of banks






































NOTE: Total number of failed banks is 165. Of these, 84 failed in the first six
months of 1989- Percentage of banks misclassified is in parentheses.
SOURCE: Author's calculations.
above 85 percent for the 12- and 18-month time
horizons. The results for the 24-month time hori-
zon are slightly better. Furthermore, a relatively
large proportion of the type II errors at the 12-
and 18-month time horizons are banks that ul-
timately failed before 24 months elapsed. Thus,
the model was signaling that these banks were
potential failures prior to their actual closure.
However, the important yardstick of success
for a failure prediction or early warning model is
its out-of-sample forecasting accuracy. To obtain
insight on this issue, I use the estimated model
to generate survival probabilities for all banks in
the estimation and holdout samples using data
for 1987, 1988, and 1989. Obviously, data are
not available for all banks for all years. For ex-
ample, only 1987 data exist for the 1988 failures.
I never reestimate the model coefficients, and
use the same cutoff values detailed above. The
results for every year are presented for each of
the various subsamples in tables 3 to 8.
Turning first to table 3, it is apparent that the
model does a relatively good job of identifying
the 1988 failed banks. The type I error rate
declines from 12.4 percent at the 12- month
horizon to 6.5 percent at the 24-month horizon.
No type II errors are possible for this subsample.
Table 4 shows the results for the 1989 fail-
ures using 1987 and 1988 data. Note that the
type I error rates remain relatively low. A look
at the type II errors again demonstrates that the
model does a reasonably good job of providing
an early warning of high-risk banks. For exam-
ple, using 1987 data, 73-3 percent of the 1989
failures were predicted to fail within 12 months
(that is, by year-end 1988).
Results for the 1990 failures (table 5) are sim-
ilar. The type I error rates are virtually the same
as those for the banks that failed in previous
years. And again, relatively high proportions of
the banks that ultimately failed in 1990 are iden-
tified as potential problems in 1987 and 1988.
Table 6 contains the 1987-1989 results for
the nonfailed banks used in the estimation
sample. Because none of these banks failed, no
type I errors are possible. The number and rate
of type II errors for this nonfailed subsample are
quite low. Table 7 contains virtually identical
results for a holdout sample of nonfailed banks.
Finally, table 8 presents results for the largest
possible sample. The total number of banks and
the numbers classified as failures and nonfailures
necessarily change through time. For the 1987
data, for example, the total number of failed
banks at the 12-month time horizon consists of
all the 1988 failures. The total number of non-
failed banks consists of the 1989 and 1990 fail-
ures and the roughly 1,500 nonfailed banks in
the estimation and holdout samples. At the 18-
month time horizon, those banks that failed in
the first six months of 1989 are removed from
the nonfailed subsample and considered to be
failures. At the 24-month time horizon, all of the
1989 failures are removed from the nonfailed
subsample and counted as failures. I use the
same procedure to define the subsamples in
subsequent years. This exercise perhaps gives
the best idea of the potential usefulness of a
PHM as an early warning model.TABLE 5
Out-of-Sample Classification

































NOTE: 1990 failed-bank data through October 31. Total number of failed
banks is 122. Of these, 89 failed in the first six months of 1989. Percentage of
banks misclassified is in parentheses.
SOURCE: Author's calculations.
The model appears to perform quite well. In
each year, type I error rates are relatively low
for all three time horizons. Similarly, type II
error rates are also quite low, particularly if the
impact of misclassification of subsequent fail-
ures is considered. For example, when 1987
data are used and subsequent failures are ex-
cluded, the type II error rates for the 12-, 18-,
and 24-month horizons fall to 2.7 percent, 5.6
percent, and 9-4 percent, respectively. As noted
above, type II errors attributable to misclassifica-
tion of banks that ultimately fail are not undesir-
able but rather indicate the ability of the model
to identify subsequent failures early. The model
appears to perform this task quite well.
The fact that the classification accuracy does
not decline over time even though the model
coefficients are not reestimated is encouraging.
It indicates that the relationship between the
explanatory variables and bank survival proba-
bilities represented by the estimated model is
relatively stable. This is a desirable characteristic
of an early warning model, since it obviates the
need to update the model coefficients or to
































NOTE: Total number of nonfailed banks in the estimation sample is 1,008. Per-




The results strongly suggest that a PHM with a
relatively small number of explanatory variables
constructed only from publicly available data
could be an effective early warning tool. The
overall classification accuracy of the estimated
model is high, while both type I and type II error
rates are relatively low. Furthermore, the model
flags a considerable proportion of failures early.
Many further refinements (in variables or in
specification, for example) are possible. In par-
ticular, it would be interesting to determine if the
currently confidential data on 30- to 89-day non-
performing loans would have a significant im-
pact on the explanatory power of this type of
equation. It would also be interesting to investi-
gate the relationship between the model's pre-
dictions and CAMEL ratings, which reflect
additional nonpublic information generated at
considerable cost.
• 12 Although the errors are not examined in detail, a cursory review
reveals that a considerable number of the type II out-of-sample errors in-
volved Texas banks. This is an important consideration given the earlier
discussion of insolvency versus failure, and may imply that the accuracy
of the model is even slightly higher than indicated by the classification
results reported in the tables.^Q
TABLE 7
Out-of-Sample Classification
























Finally, it will be interesting to see how accu-
rately the model forecasts failures in 1991 and
beyond. Some believe that the reasons why
banks are encountering financial difficulties at
present are somehow different than those faced
during the 1980s by southwestern banks, which
make up a large part of the sample used to esti-
mate this model. Many argue that effective moni-
toring of bank financial conditions requires
disclosure of additional detailed information on
the market value of assets and liabilities. If the
estimated PHM exhibits the same degree of accu-
racy reported here over the next several years, it
suggests that neither of these views is correct.
NOTE: Total number of nonfailed banks in the holdout sample is 510. Percent-











































a. 190 of these subsequently failed.
b. 154 of these subsequently failed.
c. 97 of these subsequently failed.
d. 92 of these subsequently failed.
e. 25 of these subsequently failed.
NOTE: When year-end 1987 data are used, the sample consists of the 1988,
1989, and 1990 failures and the nonfailed estimation and holdout samples. The
number of failed and nonfailed banks at each time horizon depends on the
year and time horizon examined. The percentage of banks misclassified is in
parentheses.










































































Commercial and industrial loans/
total assets
Commercial real estate loans/total
assets
Total domestic time deposits in






Primary capital/average total assets
PCR less (total nonperforming
loans/average total assets)




Percent change in state's residential
housing permits measured over the
198x to 198y period
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